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"Unstable
requirements
and immature
technologies are
the most 
significant 
contributors 
to cost and 
schedule
increase"
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Space for improvement 
In July, the US Government Accountability
Office (GAO) produced a thoughtful report 
“Space acquisitions: stronger development
practices and investment planning needed
to address continuing problems.” As defence
and space are two critical markets for the 
III-Vs community, the GAO findings and 
recommendations are worth mulling over. 
“In fiscal year 2006 alone, DOD plans to spend
almost $20bn to develop and procure satellites
and other space systems. Our work on the
acquisition of space-based capabilities over the
last several years has been conducted on two
levels. GAO has reviewed most of the major
space system acquisitions to determine their
status at different points in time and the results
are discouraging.
“Systems cost more and take much longer to
acquire, than promised, when initially approved.
In some cases, justification … for the system
when initially approved is far different from the
current status, so DOD has had to re-assess the
need to acquire that particular system and the
soundness of its acquisition strategy.
“Recognising that developing satellites is a very
complex task and one which does differ from
other military systems,” GAO has analysed the
common and causal factors for poor acquisition
outcomes.“Overall, we have found that DOD has
been unable to match resources (technology,
time, money) to requirements before beginning
individual programs, setting the stage for techni-
cal and other problems, which lead to cost and
schedule increases.”
Specifically:
* Requirements for what the satellite needed to
do, and how well it must perform are not ade-
quately defined at the beginning of a program, or
are changed significantly once the program has
begun.
* Technologies are not mature enough to be
included in product development.
* Cost estimates are unreliable - largely because
requirements have not been fully defined, and
because programs start with many unknowns
about technologies.
GAO has also reported on cross-cutting factors
that make it more difficult for DOD to achieve a
match between resources and requirements for
space acquisitions.
These include: a diverse array of organisations
with competing interests; a desire to satisfy all
requirements in a single step, regardless of the
design or technology challenge; and a tendency
for acquisition programs to take on technology
development, that should occur within the
Science & Technology environment.
“This past year alone, for example, costs have
continued to climb on the Space Based Infrared
System High (SBIRS-High)…. and pushing DOD’s
investment in this critical missile warning sys-
tem to over $9.9bn, from the initial $3.9bn 
estimate made nine years ago. DOD originally
Gail Purvis
SpaceM A N U F A C T U R I N G F O C U S
Photo by Carleton Bailie © The Boeing Company. 
A BoeingDelta II rocket successfully deploys Air Force GPS
and XSS-10, a demo satellite for the Air Force Research
Laboratory in January 2003.
planned to complete expenditures for SBIRS-
High in fiscal year 2006, for example, but cur-
rently, it plans to spend about $3.4bn in fiscal
years 2007 through 2013.
“At the same time, programs focused on develop-
ing new communications satellites are facing
cost increases and schedule delays.The National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System has been restructured and is 
facing cost increases and schedule delays, and
unit cost increases for launch vehicles have now
increased by 81% since 2002, due to erroneous
assumptions about the commercial launch mar-
ket upon which the program’s business case was
based.”
As DOD is facing these problems, it is attempting
to undertake new efforts - including the
Transformational Satellite Communications
System (TSAT) program and Space Radar 
program - which are expected to be among the
most expensive and complex ever.
DOD is heavily relying on these in its efforts to
fundamentally transform how military opera-
tions are conducted. In fact, many other weapon
systems will be interfaced with these satellites,
and are highly dependent on them for their own
success.
In addition, relatively newer programs, such as
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV),
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellite and the Wideband Gapfiller communica-
tion satellites, have also been experiencing cost
increases.
In general, the longer a system has been in devel-
opment, the greater the amount of its cost growth.
In addition, nearly all of the programs have also
experienced significant schedule delays as well.
Over the next 10 years, space systems, each year,
on average, will cost DOD in excess of $1.5bn
more than it had originally planned. Moreover,
the sum of the percentage cost increases repre-
sents an additional $20bn over the combined
lives of the programs above.
On a broader scale, DOD starts more programs
than it can afford in the long run, forcing pro-
grams to underestimate costs and over promise
capability.
As a result, there is pressure to suppress bad
news about programs, which could endanger
funding and support, as well as to skip testing
because of its high cost.
One key to success is closing the gaps between
available technologies and customer needs,
before beginning an acquisition program.This
puts programs in a better position to succeed
because they can focus on design, system inte-
gration, and manufacturing.
DOD has recently revised its space acquisition
policy, in part to attain more knowledge about
technologies before starting an acquisition.
However, GOA remain concerned that the policy
still allows programs to begin before demonstrat-
ing technologies in an operational or simulated
environment.
GAO recommends
DOD has attempted to address its problems in
space system acquisitions, but there is a critical
need to adopt practices that would assure DOD:
* Separates technology development from acqui-
sition;
* Adopts evolutionary approaches that pursue
incremental increases in capability; and
* Guides program start decisions with investment
strategies that identify (1) overall capabilities and
how to achieve them, that is, what role space
will play versus other air-, sea-, and land-based
assets and (2) priorities for funding.
Web: www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-891T. 
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“In our 2005
department-wide
assessment of
selected major
weapon 
programs, we
found that only
15% of programs
assessed began
system develop-
ment having
demonstrated all
technologies
mature.”
Commercial satellite business stirs
The Intelsat and PanAmsat merger, which gives the combined organi-
sation 53 satellites, leaves SES Global, Luxembourg, with 35 satellites
and Eutelsat, the European operator, with 23 satellites and suggests
that demand is on the increase, and the industry could be in for merg-
ers, takeovers and team-ups. Larger satellite providers are expecting
demand for video services to grow as much as 10% this year. 
Satellite companies need size to drive prices lower, and to focus on
offering high-speed data links, video programming and phone serv-
ice to developing countries, where fibre networks are scarce. For this,
they need satellites that cover not just North America, Europe and
Asia, but also Africa, the Middle East and South America. 
Loral Space and Communications, with four satellites across the
globe, is one likely for merger or acquisition. It comes out of bank-
ruptcy, with little debt, around October, and will be relisted on the
Nasdaq. Another being eyed is New Skies Satellites of the
Netherlands with five satellites, owned by Blackstone Group. Small,
regional operators are government-owned and could well become 
candidates for joint ventures.
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Highlights of recent findings
1 Advanced Extremely High Frequen-
cy Satellites (AEHF): Unit cost increased
by more than 50%. In 2004, the program
experienced cost increases of more than
15%. Schedule slippages for launching
this communication system now stretch
to over three years. Our reports attrib-
uted cost increases most recently to pro-
duction problems and changing security
requirements. Earlier cost increases were
attributed, in part, to a rush to start the
program, changing requirements, and a
lack of funding to support an overly opti-
mistic schedule. 
2 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV): Unit cost increases (for launch
vehicles) have increased by 81%. In 2004,
this program experienced cost increases of
more than 25%, which triggered statuto-
ry requirements to reassess and recertify
the program. A chief reason for cost
increases is a decline in the commercial
launch market, on which the program’s
business case was based, as well as a
reduction in anticipated launches.
Recently, the two primary contractors -
Boeing Launch Services Inc and Lockheed
Martin Space Systems Company - agreed
to form a joint venture US government
launches. It is argued that this will help
reduce costs, while enabling the govern-
ment to retain two launch systems. 
3 Mobile User Objective System
(MUGS): This is a relatively new effort:
No significant cost increases or schedule
delays are reported. However, early pro-
curement of long lead items, before
achieving a stable design for this Navy
communications system, could lead to
cost increases and the program's devel-
opment schedule remains compressed -
posing risks should software develop-
ment or other technical or design prob-
lems be encountered. 
4 Navstar Global Positioning System II
(GPS II): Recent findings: Total costs of
the GPS II modernisation program have
increased by over 20%. This is largely due
to DOD's decision to delay the start of the
follow-on GPS III program. Specifically, the
delay will require DOD to buy additional
GPS IIF satellites - so far at least seven
more than the program had planned. The
launch of the first IIR-M satellite has been
delayed at least 7 months ,due to produc-
tion problems. 
5 National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):Costs increased by roughly
10%, due to changes to the contract,
increased program management costs,
and increased funds needed to mitigate
risks. The increases include costs associat-
ed with extending the development
schedule, and increased sensor costs. 
6 Space Based Infrared System High
(SBIRS-High). This missile warning pro-
gram has experienced schedule slips of at
least 6 years, and cost increases that have
triggered legislative requirements to
reassess and recertify the program several
times - most recently this spring. While
DOD's total program cost estimate was
about $3.9bn, it is now $9.9bn - nearly a
150% unit cost increase. Reviews have
attributed past problems to an acquisition
approach that decreased oversight of con-
tractors, technology challenges, and soft-
ware development problems. DOD is cur-
rently re-examining this program, poten-
tial alternatives, and cost estimates. 
6 Space Tracking and Surveillance 
System (STSS): This is a relatively new
effort: No major reported cost increases
or schedule delays. The initial increment
of this program, started in 2002, is com-
posed of two demonstration satellites,
built under the previous Space Based
Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low) pro-
gram. SBIRS-Low incurred cost increases
and schedule delays and other problems
that were so severe, DOD abandoned the
effort. The STSS program has experi-
enced system quality and system engi-
neering problems with the payload,
however, the program office still expects
early delivery and launch of the 
satellites.
7 Space Radar. This is a relatively new
effort with no reported cost increases or
schedule delays. We reported last year
that DOD was not on a path that would
enable it to accumulate knowledge and
had not formalised agreement on
requirements needed to start this techni-
cally complex and potentially very costly
effort. Congress directed DOD to keep
space radar efforts in technology devel-
opment, so that it would accumulate
critical knowledge. In January 2005, DOD
restructured this effort, focusing on
developing smaller, demonstrator 
satellites, strengthening its partnership
with the intelligence community, and
revising its acquisition strategy. 
8 Transformational Satellite
Communications System (TSAT): This is
a relatively new effort focused on devel-
oping much more robust communication
satellites. It entered the formal acquisition
phase in 2004 with only one of seven crit-
ical technologies mature. Due to concerns
about the risks such an approach poses,
Congress reduced funds and directed that
the program focus on technology devel-
opment, before proceeding further with
acquisition activities. Although the pro-
gram started the acquisition program and
established its acquisition program base-
line with immature critical technologies,
the program director told us that the 
system development contract will not be
awarded until critical technologies are
mature.
9 Wideband Gapfiller Satellites
(WGS): Costs have increased since 2000
and DOD now anticipates buying two
additional satellites. The launch of the
first satellite has been delayed by almost
two years. This program  involves the
purchase of commercial communications
satellites for DOD purposes. However,
the program encountered design, 
integration, and manufacturing prob-
lems, due largely to the fact that it was
not able to leverage expertise from the
commercial sector. This was because
there was less than anticipated demand
for the commercial satellite. Conflicts in
scheduling for the launch pad also con-
tributed to the schedule delay. 
